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IMPLICIT BIAS IN DAILY PERCEPTIONS AND LEGAL
JUDGMENTS
Professor Keith B. Maddox* & Professor Samuel R. Sommers**
In today’s demonstration, we explored the audience’s positive and negative as-
sociations with blacks and whites. The demonstration is an adaptation of the
Implicit Association Test (www.projectimplicit.net), a computer-based task de-
signed to explore mental connections between various concepts. Participants were
presented with a list of concepts (stereotypically black and white names, pleasant
and unpleasant concepts) in a column down the middle of a screen along with the
response categories (black/white or Pleasant/Unpleasant) along the left and right
sides. When reading a word, participants were asked to categorize it by slapping the
knee (left or right) that corresponds to the category displayed on the left or right side
of the screen. Their task was to do this as fast as possible, correcting any mistakes
before going forward, and raising their hand after completing the last word in the
list. We then noted the amount of time for a critical mass of participants (approxi-
mately seventy-five percent) to complete each trial.
In simple trials, either names or valenced words are displayed. In two critical
trials, both names and valenced words were presented simultaneously in the middle
of the screen. The trials differ based on the pairings of the response categories, and
these trials tend to show a drastic difference in completion times. When participants
were required to use the same hand to categorize black names and unpleasant
words or white names and pleasant words, they tended to respond almost twice as
quickly as when using the same hand to categorize black names and pleasant words
or white names and unpleasant words. While there are individual differences
among the respondents, the demonstration provided audible and visceral evidence
of the trend. We then asked the audience to interrogate the methodological and
cultural implications of the task, ultimately concluding that the test potentially
reveals the fairly widespread implicit negative associations with blacks. With this
working hypothesis, we next discussed the nature of racial bias and its implications
for judgment in legal domains.
MADDOX: My name is Keith Maddox and I’m here with Sam
Sommers. We’re both professors in the Psychology Department at
Tufts University. We’re social psychologists broadly interested in is-
sues having to do with stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.
We’re thankful for the opportunity to come here today. We want to
thank Ben and Anna for the invitation, as well as Abigail Stewart.
Obviously it’s a somber occasion—it’s a somber topic. But again,
* Associate Professor of Psychology, Tufts University; Director, Tufts University Social
Cognition Lab.
** Associate Professor of Psychology, Tufts University; Laboratory Director, Diversity &
Intergroup Relations Lab.
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what we’re hoping to do is to provide a perspective on thinking
about the extent to which bias can take place, and have an influ-
ence on the types of processes that range from identifying whether
or not child abuse has been taking place, all the way through the
criminal justice system.
We’re going to start out by talking a little bit about a perspective
in social psychology that’s become a little bit more well-known in
recent years: implicit bias.1 What it does is, we think, challenge our
commonplace understandings of what bias is and what bias looks
like. And then we’re going to spend some time talking a little bit
about how these kinds of biases, either implicit or explicit, can have
an influence on the kinds of judgments that you make in your day-
to-day interactions with others.
Finally, what we’re going to do is try to explore this, in the spirit
of today’s conversation, by thinking about some of the psychologi-
cal evidence, the evidence that has to do with the extent to which
these kinds of biases can manifest themselves in legal decision-mak-
ing contexts.
So when we’re thinking about implicit bias, the first thing we
want to talk about here is this idea that these biases that may be
present in our environments are pervasive. They can affect a num-
ber of different kinds of characteristics (bases of social category
membership) and, again, the extent to which we’ve absorbed (to
some extent) the kinds of messages about these different groups. In
terms of how they’re portrayed in the media; in terms of how
they’re portrayed with respect to their representation in the individ-
ual contexts in which we work. They can have an influence, a subtle
influence, in terms of the ways in which we might build associations
in our minds, and can influence some of our behaviors.
The idea is also that these are unconscious, that they may not
necessarily be consistent with the way you think about yourself. You
may think about yourself as being a fairly egalitarian person and as
someone who doesn’t have bias. And I think that’s inconsistent with
what we think about bias as a kind of commonplace notion—that
it’s something that people have that reflects an explicit prejudice,
or an explicit sort of bias towards particular group members, and
they use that animosity in terms of making judgments about others.
But in fact, what this might suggest is that maybe there are elements
1. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124
(2012) (distinguishing explicit, implicit, and structural bias and applying these concepts to
criminal and employment cases in the courtroom); Marcia McNutt, Implicit Bias, 352 SCIENCE
1035 (2016) (examining the role of implicit bias in peer review); Katherine B. Spencer,
Amanda K. Charbonneau & Jack Glaser, Implicit Bias and Policing, 10 SOC. & PERSONALITY
PSYCHOL. COMPASS 50 (2016) (discussing implicit bias and proposed solutions in policing).
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of bias that aren’t necessarily reflecting that explicit component,
that there are more implicit biases that could potentially influence
our judgments and behaviors, even if we otherwise think of our-
selves as well-meaning individuals.
And the last part here is that biases can influence the kinds of
judgments and behavior beyond just simple knee-slapping. So what
I’m going to talk about is how these kinds of biases and stereotypes
can have an influence on the types of judgments that we make every
day. Then Sam will take over and start talking a little bit about how
these judgments exert influence in legal decision-making contexts.
The idea here is that the stereotypes that we see—stereotypes
that we learn while growing up in a particular culture—these ste-
reotypes are, in a way, a byproduct of the ways in which people
naturally process information and develop categories about people,
in terms of the group memberships that they belong to, seeing as-
sociations, building those associations over time. That stereotyping
is sort of the way people process information.
What’s important about this is that now we start to think about
stereotyping and the use of stereotyping as not only an individual-
based process. It’s not a process that’s based solely on someone who
is prejudiced or someone who is biased or racist or sexist. That is
possible, right? There are definitely individuals who have more ex-
treme views with respect to these ideas compared to others. But
what we want to talk about here is the pervasiveness of it, the idea
that there might be otherwise well-meaning individuals who can ex-
hibit these kinds of stereotypes. And in that sense, it helps to
explain a little bit more about the pervasiveness of the kinds of bi-
ases that we see, and the effects of those biases in terms of the
outcomes of various group memberships.
Stereotypes are like lenses. So if you’re wondering why I’m wear-
ing my sunglasses, it’s that I wanted to show you that a stereotype is
almost like a lens that you’re not aware that you’re wearing, a lens
that filters how you see the world. It filters what you remember
about the world, it filters the kinds of attributions that you make
about others’ behavior. What we’re hoping to do today is to give
you some information about the existence of this lens and the op-
portunity to find the context in which it might be biasing
judgments in ways that you think are not necessarily appropriate for
the work that you do, and to use that information to try to lift the
lenses again and to try to see the world in a more veridical way.
So in general, and this is sort of reflected in some of the work
that was talked about earlier this morning, when you think about
the context under which you might have some association about
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what you might be looking at, a hypothesis about what is child
abuse, a hypothesis about the kind of person that might be more
likely to engage in these kinds of activities, these hypotheses can
guide your judgments in certain ways that are going to snowball
into making a judgment that may be biased. It may not necessarily
reflect what really happened.
So in this sense, you can start to think about the different con-
texts under which using stereotypes is more likely when behavior is
ambiguous, when it’s not exactly clear what’s going on. Whenever
judgments are somewhat subjective, or it takes someone’s opinion
to make a decision, when you’re busy or distracted, if you’re over-
loaded with a number of cases or workload or distracted by other
pieces of information, stereotype use is more likely, and then also
in situations when you might feel threatened or insecure. All these
are conditions that exist in our day-to-day lives under varying differ-
ent conditions. We might experience the opportunities to exhibit
bias (apart from the fact that we may be well-meaning and trying to
do our work in ways that are going to be more reflective of being
egalitarian) and because these kinds of biases are often uncon-
scious, they can filter into the ways we make judgments, and
ultimately then lead to biased outcomes.  Again, it has nothing to
do with our intentions, but have a lot more to do with the ways in
which we process information.
We’re hoping to give you a little bit more nuanced view on the
ways bias might play a role. Hopefully that demonstration [de-
scribed in the abstract] might have revealed this to some extent,
even if it’s not necessarily you—with respect to your performance
[on the word association and knee slapping demonstration]. Look-
ing at the performance of the room and understanding the
generality of these kinds of effects could give you a little bit broader
database of knowledge to understand the ways in which they might
have influences in the various domains in which you’re working.
So now I want to transition and give Sam the mic. He’s going to
talk to us a little bit about the applications of these kinds of ideas
with respect to legal decision-making contexts.
SOMMERS: Let me start with the basic proposition that follows
up on what Keith has been discussing here, namely that race,
ethnicity, and other social category information color the way we
see the world. More generally, just taking a step back from even the
demographics, it is a well-demonstrated, oft-cited conclusion in the
behavioral sciences that expectation colors how we see the world
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around us.2 If I were teaching my undergraduates right now in an
intro psych course, I would use a variety of methods of doing that. I
play them song lyrics. I then play the song lyrics backwards. They
listen; can they hear anything? No. When I then show them what
the supposedly backwards satanic song lyrics are, and I play it again,
they hear them. When you’re looking for it, you hear it, you see it.
You heard examples earlier this morning about how when you have
an expectation, whether in medical diagnosis or as an investigator
in a police proceeding, that something may be the case, that can
change the way that you actually perceive the facts on the ground.
This is a well-demonstrated conclusion in the behavioral sciences
known as confirmation bias3—this idea that what we expect to see
often colors what we actually see.4 That plays itself out quite a bit
when it comes to race, ethnicity, other social category information,5
along the lines of the demonstration that we started here with this
morning. It’s not just for race and ethnicity. We could have done a
variety of different implicit association tests. And if you were some-
one who didn’t have trouble and wasn’t slower pairing unpleasant
with white than pairing unpleasant with black, if you gave us
enough time and enough different tests, and enough PowerPoint
2. See, e.g., Hester de Boer, Roel J. Bosker & Margaretha P.C. van der Werf, Sus-
tainability of Teacher Expectation Bias Effects on Long-Term Student Performance, 102 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 168, 174–75, 178 (2010) (finding that teacher expectation bias differed among
students with different backgrounds and abilities); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Chris Bourg, Gender
as Status: An Expectation States Approach, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 217–41 (Alice H. Eagly,
Anne E. Beall & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2d ed. 2004) (describing expectation states theory
as a way to explain the origins and significance of beliefs about the status of various groups).
3. See Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal Interrogations: Why Innocent Black
Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely, 17 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 562, 575 (2011) (defin-
ing “confirmation bias” as “assuming a hypothesis is true, searching for evidence that
supports the hypothesis, and asking questions that are designed to bolster the hypothesis”).
4. See Carole Hill, Amina Memon & Peter McGeorge, The Role of Confirmation Bias in
Suspect Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 357, 362 (2008) (finding
that expectations of guilt resulted in more guilt-presumptive questions among interviewers of
students suspected of cheating); see also Martine B. Powell, Carolyn H. Hughes-Scholes &
Stefanie J. Sharman, Skill in Interviewing Reduces Confirmation Bias, 9 J. INVESTIG. PSYCHOL. &
OFFENDER PROFILING 126 (2012) (finding certain interview techniques can reduce confirma-
tion bias).
5. See, e.g., Najdowski, supra note 3, at 575 (suggesting that if investigators are more
likely to misclassify black and white suspects as guilty because of racial differences in guilt-
presumptive nonverbal behavior that they may be more likely to employ coercive questioning
tactics with black suspects that result in coerced confessions by innocent black suspects);
CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER 161–62 (2011) (describing how confirmation bias
drives gender stereotypes); Linda van den Bergh et al., The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teach-
ers: Relations to Teacher Expectations and the Ethnic Achievement Gap, 47 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 497,
510–17 (2010) (finding that implicit biases resulted in different expectations of student
achievement based on their diverse ethnic backgrounds).
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slides and enough of your slapping energy, we would find some-
thing else:s sexual orientation, political affiliation, body type,
socioeconomic status, or what have you.
The legal domain is not immune from this. There is nothing
magical that happens when you become a police officer, a juror, a
judge, or an attorney that exempts you from these processes. So
implicit bias colors the way we see the world around us as everyday
human beings and, believe it or not, the legal system is populated
by everyday human beings. So these processes are at play as well.
And we know from a variety of research studies that have demon-
strated over the years, again, from jurors and civilian eye witnesses,
to police investigators, to judges, to attorneys to college professors,
that these factors influence the way we see the world.6
There’s a famous study often talked about in social psychology
circles by Allport and Postman in 1947,7 and it has a bit of an apoc-
ryphal urban legend aspect to it now as well. What was done in this
study was, to boil it down to its essence, individuals saw this drawing.
They saw a drawing of a subway car, a trolley car, and two individu-
als having a conversation of some sort, a darker-skinned individual
in a hat standing with empty hands and a lighter-skinned individual
holding a switchblade.8 The way the story is often told is that people
who saw this drawing and were later tested for their eyewitness
memory for what they had observed erroneously remembered the
switchblade in the hand of the darker-skinned individual. That’s
not quite what really happened in the actual study.
What happened in the actual study is it was more a study in inves-
tigation of rumor transmission. It was basically a version of the kid’s
game “telephone,” where one person says to another person who
says to another person who says to another person what happened.
But in close to half, or by some accounting over half of the in-
stances, at least at some point in that chain of rumor transmission,
the switchblade did magically move from the lighter-skinned indi-
vidual to the darker-skinned individual here.9 This is regardless of
whether it’s the true data or the more apocryphal version of the
data that are talked about, it remains a sort of seminal, oft-cited
6. See, e.g., Hill, Memon & McGeorge, supra note 4, at 362 (finding that expectations of
guilt resulted in more guilt-presumptive questions among interviewers of students suspected
of cheating); see also Powell, Hughes-Scholes & Sharman, supra note 4 (finding certain inter-
view techniques can reduce confirmation bias); van den Bergh et al., supra note 5, at 510–17
(finding that implicit biases resulted in different expectations of student achievement based
on their diverse ethnic backgrounds).
7. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR
(1947) (studying how rumors change over time and diffuse among persons).
8. Id. at 99–115.
9. Id.
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example of the ways in which our expectations can color what we
see; in this case, in an eyewitness-type scenario which certainly has
application for the legal system.
What I would like to do in the remainder of our time is talk
about some more current research that demonstrates the points
that Keith made earlier here that, yes, there’s a general influence of
these kinds of expectations on the way we see the world. It plays
itself out in an important and troubling ways in the legal domain as
well.
We’re going to start with the research of Jennifer Eberhardt. Jen-
nifer Eberhardt is a social psychologist at Stanford. And what
Eberhardt—a recent MacArthur grant awardee—and her col-
leagues did was conduct a series of studies looking at what they
refer to as the bi-directional relationship between thoughts about
race and thoughts about crime: bi-directional in that their argu-
ment is that when thoughts about crime are active, so too are most
people’s thoughts about certain racial groups.10 And, for that mat-
ter, when people’s thoughts about certain racial groups, typically
African-American and Latino in American society today, are acti-
vated, so too are thoughts about crime. So you’re going to get a
little bit of a research method talk here. But I think it illustrates
these conclusions nicely.
There are multiple studies in Eberhardt’s and colleagues’ paper
in 2004.11 In the first one—and this actually speaks to a question
that was asked earlier—about how pervasive are these associations,
do you see them as much among non-white individuals? That’s
something for us to discuss here during questions and the round-
table discussion.
The first study was conducted with white college students, Stan-
ford and Berkeley students. The independent variable in this study,
in other words, the variable manipulated by the researchers, was the
subliminal presentation of a face.12 So if you’re a participant in this
study, what happens is you see something flash on the screen in
front of you, and you can see that it’s something, but you’re not
quite sure exactly what it is.13 And for half of the individuals, this
presented stimulus that’s too quick for your conscious awareness to
identify what it is, is a photograph of a white male.14 And for half of
the individuals in the study, again, determined at random, what
10. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 878–89 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 878–80.
13. Id.
14. Id.
730 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
they see is a photograph of a black male.15 So subliminally, it’s pho-
tographs of a white man or a black man appearing in front of you
in your visual field at the beginning of this study. What’s of interest
to the researcher is their dependent variable, their outcome mea-
sure, which is the ability to recognize degraded objects, or faintly
visible images.
So these images that are pixelated come into focus, come into
view very slowly. Your job as a participant is to push the button and
say, “I know what that is. That’s a sofa.” “I know what that is, that’s
the moon.” Some of the images in question in this study were re-
lated to crime—weapons, other images relevant to either violence
or perhaps handcuffs.16 What Eberhardt and her colleagues found
is when individuals were primed with a white face, they are quicker
in identifying control objects that have nothing to do with crime.17
They’re actually slower to identify crime-relevant objects. For the
other group, it’s the opposite pattern of results.18 The people subli-
minally primed with the photograph of a black male were able to
identify crime-related objects more quickly.19 The conclusion in
plainer English: activating thoughts related to the category black
activates thoughts related to crime.20 When, even subliminally, an
image of a black male is presented to the participants in this study,
they are primed, they are ready, they are more likely to see and
quickly recognize an image that’s related to crime. The thought,
that link between race and crime, is a strong one for participants.
Their second study used white male students as subjects, this
time from Stanford.21 The researchers switch the order of their
stimuli in this study, essentially.22 Their independent variable, what
they manipulate, is images, again shown subliminally, to their par-
ticipants, some of which are related to crime—gun, revolver,
handcuff, prison bars—and for other individuals, images that have
nothing to do with crime whatsoever.23 So now the subliminal pres-
entation is about crime.
They want to see what happens when you activate people’s
thoughts about crime.24 Their dependent measure is something
15. Id.
16. Id.
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that’s going to sound difficult to understand: a dot-probe task re-
sponse time. If you’re a participant in this study, you stare at a
screen and you’re told to look at a fixation point in the middle of
the screen. And then two faces pop up, not subliminally. There are
two faces that are there and you just get to look. There’s no explicit
instruction as to what you’re supposed to be doing in this study.
This is a paradigm that’s sometimes used with children too. Or,
for that matter, you could use this paradigm with animals to try to
capture what they are looking at, where is their visual attention fo-
cused? We know where their visual attention is focused because
eventually these photos disappear, and their true job is to identify
which side of the screen a cross is on. So you have the photos, they
disappear, then the subject identifies where the cross mark is: “Oh,
it’s over there.” What you’re able to find is, well, if individuals are
quicker to identify this cross when it’s behind, in this instance,
where the black male’s face was, it suggests that that’s where they
were looking, right? They were already looking at the left side of
the visual field, so therefore this cross is easier to find. If they’re
quicker to identify the cross when it’s on the right side, behind the
white face, well, they must have been looking at the white face
preferentially.
What did Eberhardt and colleagues find?25 Let’s get straight to
the conclusion: activating people’s thoughts related to crime leads
to more attention to black faces. When the prime before the study
was relevant to crime, when people were shown subliminal images
related to crime, these white respondents were looking at the black
faces later.26 Two faces shown to them? More likely to look at the
black faces.27 When the image is not related to crime, if anything
the other way around.28 Again, activating thoughts related to crime
leads participants in these studies to attend more to black faces.29
Now, these conclusions, this idea that there is some potential link
between our thoughts about crime and our thoughts about race is
not limited to one researcher, is not limited to one set of studies, is
not limited to these studies that look at subliminal presentation of
information. I could have chosen a variety of different examples to
give you here in the bullet points you’re about to see. I’m just going
to give you a few recent, and I think persuasive and important, and
in most instances sobering findings related to implicit bias and law.
25. Id. at 883.
26. Id. at 882–83.
27. Id. at 882.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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A recent meta-analysis, published just this year in the Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, aggregates the data from a variety
of police simulation studies, studies in which individuals, civilians,
and police officers are shown a series of scenes.30 You see an indi-
vidual, usually a male, sometimes he’s white, sometimes he’s
African American, holding an object in his hand, a clicker, a wallet,
something innocuous—a phone—or a weapon.31 Your job in these
studies is to identify, is this someone who’s dangerous, do I need to
push the shoot button or the not shoot button?32 There is a racial
bias observed across this body of literature that suggests the shooter
bias, such that people (police officers included, though the data are
more mixed with police officers)33 are quicker to identify an armed
individual who is black, quicker to identify an unarmed individual
as such when he is white, more likely to make mistakes with the
unarmed black suspect, more likely to make mistakes with the
armed white suspect, and so forth.34
In a recent paper I published with Satia Marotta, a graduate stu-
dent at Tufts, we summarized research on a variety of outcomes in
the legal domain, one of them having to do with charging deci-
sions, plea deals, and other trial outcomes. We found that across
different research programs, when it comes to decisions to charge,
whether it comes to a defense attorney making a decision as to what
is a reasonable plea deal to take for the client, there’s differential
performance based on whether we’re talking about a white versus
African American defendant.35 For example, with the plea bargain
data, defense attorneys are likely to report being willing to consider
less friendly, less lenient plea deals, less beneficial plea deals for
their African American versus white clients.36 That could reflect
some version of implicit bias and prejudice on the part of the attor-
neys; it could reflect a realistic assessment of the system, such that
my defendant is not going to get great treatment from a jury or a
30. See generally Yara Mekawi & Konrad Bresin, Is the Evidence from Racial Bias Shooting
Task Studies a Smoking Gun? Results from a Meta-Analysis, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120
(2015).
31. See id. at 120, 126.
32. Id. at 120–21.
33. Id. at 128.
34. Id.
35. See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Satia A. Marotta, Racial Disparities in Legal Out-
comes: On Policing, Charging Decisions, and Criminal Trial Proceedings, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 103, 106–07 (2014) (discussing racial bias and disparity in legal out-
comes, including policing, charging decisions, and criminal trial outcomes).
36. Id. at 106.
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judge here. For this kind of defendant, that might not be a bad
deal.37
Americans in public opinion surveys express greater support for
trying violent juveniles as adults when the example provided in the
survey is a case involving a black offender—research that Aneeta
Rattan at Stanford has conducted.38 Again, just asking the public
about, do you think it’s okay, do you support charging juvenile of-
fenders as adults when it’s a violent crime, when the example case
that’s presented to illustrate the topic involves a serial black of-
fender, a youthful offender, people are significantly more in favor
of charging juveniles as adults.39
This extends beyond just the legal domain. We’re talking today
about the healthcare domain. There are data in that domain, there
are data in our school system. A recent study by Jason Okonofua
and Jennifer Eberhardt, again at Stanford, on school discipline,
suggests that teachers are less likely to give a third chance to black
versus white students when school misbehavior scenarios are
presented to them. Kids tend to get a first chance, a second chance,
but it’s two strikes you’re out when you’re an African American stu-
dent as opposed to the third strike that a white student might get.40
So where does this leave us? What are the thoughts we would like
to leave you with as we segue into the rest of today’s discussion? We
were asked to provide a little bit of background on what the re-
search suggests with regard to implicit bias, how these processes
play out, how they influence our perceptions of one another, and
how they potentially influence us in legal domains.
There is no silver bullet solution to these problems that we are
prepared to offer you here today. We would be much more famous
and important individuals if we had that. What I will say, what I will
leave you with is some of the categories of potential strategies that
we discuss in that paper, the Sommers and Marotta paper that I
mentioned earlier.41 The categories of solutions or interventions
you often hear people talk about would include things such as bet-
ter empirical documentation of disparities. So, for example, in race
and policing, there is a movement, and some of this spearheaded
37. Id.
38. Aneeta Rattan, Cynthia S. Levine, Carol S. Dweck & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Race and
the Fragility of the Legal Distinction between Juveniles and Adults, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 2–4 (2012).
39. Id.
40. Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining of
Young Students, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 617, 619, 620–22 (2015).
41. See generally Sommers & Marotta, supra note 35, at 108–09 (discussing racial bias and
disparity in legal outcomes, including policing, charging decisions, and criminal trial
outcomes).
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by an Interuniversity Consortium of Researchers and Law Enforce-
ment officials spearheaded by Phil Goff at UCLA to collect better
data on stops, on use of force, and on police outcomes by race.42
Even police departments have of late become more on board
with the idea that better data here will only help everyone to be
able to say here’s what is going on, here’s what’s not going on.43 But
often having even the data is very difficult. We’ve given talks to uni-
versity police departments and asked, said things that, “Well, we’ve
had students say they feel like students of color are more likely to
be stopped and asked for ID or stuff.” And they say, “Oh, we assure
you that doesn’t happen on campus.” And we said, “Do we have the
data for that?” “Oh, we don’t think so.” So having the data for that
makes such a claim, to us, and I think to many people, more
compelling.
Bias training is something that’s discussed, and now there’s also
research in the published literature that suggests that not all bias
trainings are created equally, and they’re not always as effective as
they are intended to be.44 But certainly, when you hear what Keith
is talking about at the beginning, implicit bias, these unconscious
associations, one strategy or one potential remedy is to make the
implicit associations explicit—to talk about them. You heard very
early on in the introductory remarks today that these are difficult
discussions, difficult conversations we’re having, but that it’s often
important to have those difficult conversations, to at least have on
the table the idea that we are, even despite our best efforts and
intentions, biased. That can have some effects in the long run.
You hear a lot of conversation about increasing institutional di-
versity, and certainly that’s a positive step in many domains. Does it
solve the problems? No. Having a more diverse police force is cer-
tainly great. It helps build perceived legitimacy if nothing else.
There are data that suggest that police officers of a variety of back-
grounds exhibit some of the same tendencies we’ve talked about
42. See generally Racial Bias in Policing, CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY
(CPLE), https://www.russellsage.org/research/working-groups/rsf-working-group-racial-
bias-policing (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
43. See, e.g., Robert Rogers, Richmond Police Chief a Prominent Participant in Protest Against
Police Violence, EAST BAY TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2014/
12/09/richmond-police-chief-a-prominent-participant-in-protest-against-police-violence/
(citing Richmond deputy police chief saying that “[w]e get the conversation about use of
force . . . . This is an opportunity for all police departments, including ours, to look inward
and examine our approaches and get better”).
44. See Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Train-
ing the Answer?, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 302–06 (2015) (discussing the promise and
limitations of implicit racial bias training).
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today.45 Institutional diversity is great, but just as it is in a university,
when it comes to legal institutions, it is not a cure-all either.
In short, the final point we’ll make and want to leave you with is
that biased perception, judgment, and outcome are present in the
legal arena as in others. I have had conversations over the years
now, having served as an expert witness, been in conversations with
attorneys and judges and others in which sometimes the sentiment
is expressed that these studies are very interesting and compelling,
but people slapping legs, people judging fictitious individuals or
pushing keys on a computer screen, that’s not what goes on in a
court of law. What goes on in a court of law, what goes on in a
police interrogation, that’s high stakes. It’s as high stakes as it gets,
and people are on their best behavior. But their being on their best
behavior does not exempt any of us from having these conversa-
tions or from pondering these processes. We know all too well that
disparities like this continue to exist.
So with that, I will say thank you for your attention and
participation.
45. See Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, Megan L. Knowles & Margo J. Monteith, Black Americans’
Implicit Racial Associations and their Implications for Intergroup Judgment, 21 SOC. COGNITION 61,
73–74, 79 (2003) (finding that black participants exhibited a significant preference for
whites in identifying preferred partners for intellectually challenging tasks); Brian A. Nosek,
Mahzarin R. Banaj & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 101, 105–06 (2002) (find-
ing that among tens of thousands of people who completed the black-white Implicit
Association Test, white participants overwhelmingly exhibited more pro-white bias compared
to black participants who exhibited far less pro-black bias).
